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Abstract
Business representatives and union leaders in highly
industrialised countries often accuse the governments of less-
developed countries of practising social dumping in the sense of
deliberately neglecting  work-place safety legislation, co-
determination rights and other fringe benefits which define the
quality of workplaces. This paper refutes this view by modelling
the transition path of a less-developed small open economy that
faces transactions costs when trading capital and labour with the
rest of the world. It shows that competitive markets and
competitive governments choose Pareto efficient transition
strategies which are characterised by a sluggish development of
market wages and government-imposed social standards. 
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The Accusation of Social Dumping
Business representatives and union leaders in highly industrialised countries often accuse the
governments of less developed countries of practising social dumping in the sense of maintaining
an underdeveloped welfare state to create a competitive cost advantage for their own industries.
In particular they argue that the less-developed countries deliberately neglect the legislation for
good social standards in terms of social fringe benefits, protection against injuries, pension
schemes, co-determination rights and the like. To stop the seemingly unfair competition resulting
from social dumping they postulate an international harmonisation of social conditions, and
sometimes they even advocate retaliatory trade restrictions to enforce the harmonisation.
International agreements like those of the International Labor Organisation (ILO) or the
EU Social Charter reflect this influence in that they define a number of social minimum standards
which are binding for the signing parties. The EU Social Charter prescribes a weekly maximum
working time, minimum recreation periods, minimum safety standards for new and old machin-
ery, rules for the employment of minors, equal treatment of gender, minimum times for maternity
leaves, dismissal protection rules for pregnant women and many additional workers’ rights.
1
Similarly, the ILO members have agreed to establish a system of labour standards
2 regarding
minimum wages, maximum working hours per week and minimum rest time per week, a guaran-
teed number of holidays with pay and the prohibition of the worst forms of child labour. 
                                                
1  Social Community charter of the fundamental social rights of workers, COM (89) 248 final. See also Berié (1993)
and Feldmann (1999).
2  A comprehensive introduction to ILO's labour standards can be found in Plant (1994). ILO has issued a total of
183 conventions on labour standards to date. See, in particular,
the minimum wage fixing convention (No. 131, http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?C131),
the hours of work (industry) convention (No. 1, http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?C1),
the weekly rest (industry) convention (No. 14, http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?C14),
the holidays with pay convention (revised) (No, 132, http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?C132) and4
This paper will analyse the motives for low labour standards in less developed countries
and examine the justification of harmonisation agreements like the EU Social Charter and the
ILO conventions. For this purpose it will model the transition growth path of a less-developed
country that joins a well-developed economic core area. The EU eastern enlargement can be taken
as an example of this problem. Before joining, the less-developed country has a very low labour
productivity, low wages and low social standards, but after joining it will catch up by sending
guest workers to the core region and attracting capital investment. Because of the factor mobility,
factor prices will change and the national government of the joining country will continuously
revise its social policies. The question is whether the transition process brought about jointly by
private market forces and the forces of systems competition is efficient in any meaningful sense
and whether, if it is not, supra-national actions such as the above-mentioned harmonisation
agreements are necessary to improve the allocation of resources. 
Redistribution vs. Wages in Kind
Analysing the accusation of social dumping is not a trivial exercise because it refers to two com-
pletely different phenomena which should not simply be lumped together, although this is fre-
quently done in public debates. One refers to wages, working conditions and wage related fringe
benefits that make up the employers’ labour costs. The other refers to the redistribution of re-
sources between different types of individuals, such as tax-financed transfers to the poor. 
Concerning the second type of social dumping it can be shown that income redistribution
between the rich and the poor will indeed be eroded in systems competition. From the point of
view of an individual country, redistribution among mobile income earners is not rational. On the
one hand, redistribution cannot effectively change the distribution of net incomes when labour
                                                                                                                                                             
the worst forms of child labour convention (No. 182, http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?C182).5
can migrate across the borders and wages react to this migration. On the other, redistribution cre-
ates budgetary problems for the government by attracting the people who receive government
benefits and driving away those who pay for them. As redistribution is eroded even when, from
an ex ante perspective, it is in the general interest of risk averse citizens from all countries, a fail-
ure of systems competition can be stated. This may be called social dumping. 
However, it is doubtful whether this is the kind of social dumping to which the accusa-
tions of business and union leaders in the developed countries refer primarily, because the nexus
between neglecting redistribution and a competitive advantage seems less obvious than the one
between bad working conditions and a competitive advantage. From a theoretical perspective the
case is also not clear. It is true that a fall in net taxes on above-average income earners may re-
duce the cost of capital and the wage cost for qualified labour. However, reducing the net social
transfers to less qualified labour may lead to emigration and higher wage demands by the workers
at the bottom end of the income scale, and this, in itself, will tend to raise the wage cost. What
business and union leaders have in mind, therefore seems to be the working conditions, wages
and wage related fringe benefits, which all have a direct impact on the wage cost.
It is undoubtedly the case that, in countries like Portugal or Spain, not only the wages
themselves but also the safety standards in the firms, the social insurance contributions, the num-
ber of holidays, the length of maternity leave, the payment of wages in cases of sickness, the
safety regulation for work places and similar achievements of the welfare state are well below
those in the more advanced European countries like Sweden or Germany. The accusation made
by business representatives and union leaders is that the low wage standards are partly the result
of a conscious policy of social dumping which is carried out intentionally, or at least tolerated, by
the national governments of the less-developed countries. These governments, it is maintained,6
stick to low social standards and do not care about low wages, because they know that competi-
tive advantages for the domestic industries result.
The social standards meant in this context can best be understood as wages in kind pre-
scribed by the government. Surely the utility of workers increases if they receive better safety
standards and other wage-related fringe benefits, just as a pecuniary wage payment increases their
utility, and surely the firms’ labour costs increase if they have to provide these benefits, just as
they would with a pecuniary wage increase. As both the pecuniary wage and the wage in kind are
to be paid from the same marginal value product of labour, public legislation on wages in kind
does not involve a redistribution of resources between different groups of individuals. It is instead
similar to legislation setting wages itself. 
This demonstrates that the two potential reasons for social dumping should not be lumped
together. They refer to completely different economic phenomena, and the similarity is purely
semantic, notwithstanding the fact that they both may appear simultaneously with actual policy
measures. Welfare dumping is not wage dumping.
Why are the Differences in Direct and Indirect Wage Costs so High?
There are at present considerable differences in wage costs in Europe. Gross hourly wage costs
differ substantially among the European countries. While the average wage cost is about eighteen
euros in the EU countries, the differences between the two countries with the highest and the two
countries with the lowest wage costs exceed ten euros per hour, and one third of the countries has
wage costs which are more than three times as high as those of the two countries with the lowest
costs. Figure 1 gives an overview of the wage differences among the European countries.7
The figure breaks down the wage costs into direct and indirect costs according to the EU-
ROSTAT definitions.
3 Direct costs are defined as gross wages per hour, basically the official an-
nual pay divided by the number of working hours. They include the employees’ social security
contributions, overtime supplements, shift compensation, regularly paid premia, pay for vacation
and national holidays, year-end bonuses and similar items. Indirect costs consist of employer so-
cial insurance contributions, sick pay schemes, and other social expenses such as those for sports
facilities, canteens, medical services and vocational training. Indirect wage costs according the
EUROSTAT definitions are part of what this paper considers as the costs of social standards,
however they do not exhaust this category of wage costs. Co-determination rights of workers,
safety requirements for machinery, dismissal protection rules or constraints on working time incur
additional indirect wage costs which are not included in the official definitions. 
                                                
3  See Schröder (2000, p. 77).8
Figure 1: Labour Cost in Manufacturing in European Countries 1999 (Euro per working hour)
Source: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, Database, 2000. 
Note: Labour cost of male and female workers. The 1999 EU-15 average is a weighted average with working popula-
tion (Eurostat, Eurostatistics 11/2000, p. 45) as weights. 
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Despite these omissions the indirect wage costs shown in Figure 1 are substantial, some-
times covering 40% of the total wage costs or more. They clearly are important determinants of
the competitiveness of the single countries. Note that countries with a high direct wage also tend
to have a high indirect wage. This points to a systematic relationship that will be explored below.
The business and union representatives argue that the large differences in wages and la-
bour standards shown in Figure 1 are incompatible with a common European market where no
trade restrictions prevail and the freedom of settlement is granted. In such a market wages and
working conditions should be the same to ensure fair competition among the European countries.
The fact that they are not the same, it is maintained, indicates social dumping and should be seen
as an unhealthy implication of systems competition which ought to be overcome by extending the
scope of common European wage and working standards. 
However, the argument neglects the fact that differences in wages and working conditions
may partly reflect natural transitional phenomena during the adjustment phase towards a uniform
European economy. After all, a truly common market without customs barriers and full economic
freedom was not achieved until the 1990s. Europe may still be in a convergence phase in which
pre-existing differences have not yet been overcome. If this phase is driven by natural forces it is
not clear that the convergence process could be improved by European harmonisation agreements
that force the countries to converge faster in selected areas than they would have done had they
been able to make unilateral decisions. 
The important aspect of the convergence process is the existence of frictions in the form
of adjustment and migration costs. The abstraction from such frictions is appropriate for a long-
run analysis. Indeed, the new freedom of movement in Europe will, in the long run, lead to a gen-
eral convergence of economic conditions, and there can be little doubt that the mechanism of10
factor price equalisation assumed there and described more fully by the foreign trade literature
will eventually make their effects felt. With unrestricted exchange of goods, free choice of work
place, and free capital movement, the current differences in overall wage costs certainly cannot be
maintained forever. Over the long term, countries like Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece will
find their factor prices converging towards those of the European core countries.
However, because of the frictions, factor price equalisation cannot come about overnight.
It may take decades for an approximate factor price equalisation to take place. The main reason
for the delay is the time needed for the accumulation of a modern stock of capital in the countries
which are still lagging behind. It is true that financial capital is as nimble as a deer. What matters,
however, is real capital, and real capital is as slow as a tortoise. Real capital faces substantial ad-
justment costs. Many kinds of obstacles must be overcome before it can move into low wage ar-
eas. These obstacles include management constraints, the sequential nature of building processes,
the roundaboutness of multi-firm production chains, learning-by-doing constraints, the initial lack
of public infrastructure and, last but not least, the time consuming construction of the economic
and political institutions which are the backbone of efficient modern market economies.
When accumulation of real capital is slow, wages, too, lag for a long time behind those in
the more developed regions, and workers in the less-developed areas have strong incentives to
migrate to the high wage countries as guest workers. Compared to capital, guest workers are very
mobile. Many of them may come in the short term when the wage differences are large, but they
return very quickly to their home countries when these differences become smaller. Nevertheless,
guest workers face considerable migration costs. These show up less in migration delays than in
the fact that many people prefer to stay in their own countries even when wage differentials are
large. Objective and subjective costs prevent these people from simply maximising their wages11
income. Looked at in this way, persistent differences in pecuniary wages between the developed
and the less well-developed countries of Europe seem quite natural for a long period to come de-
spite the extension of the four basic freedoms granted in the Treaty of Rome.
Social standards are not directly explained by market forces because they are typically set
by the government. Nevertheless, they may be explained indirectly, since it makes little sense for
a government to prescribe in-kind benefits to workers that are out of proportion to the direct
wages agreed to in private labour contracts. In the light of the empirical information given in Fig-
ure 1 it seems plausible to expect governments to develop the social standards in proportion with
the direct wages paid, taking the stages of their respective countries’ developments into account.
A sluggish adjustment of social standards may also be a natural feature of a transformation proc-
ess which leads to alignment with the economic conditions in the developed regions only in the
very long run.
A Simple Model of the Economic Catching-up Process
To analyse these issues formally, the transformation process of an initially underdeveloped coun-
try that joins a developed economic area will be modelled. The purpose of the model is to help
understand the market forces and the actions of national governments in order to find an answer
to the question of whether an international harmonisation of labour standards and wages could
improve the allocation of resources. 
Consider a small underdeveloped ‘joining’ country which opens its borders to a large al-
ready developed ‘core area’. Goods, financial capital, and technical knowledge are completely12
mobile across the country’s borders. The uniform goods prices are normalised to one, and the uni-
form financial market interest rate is set in the core area at the level r.
4
Real capital and labour are mobile only to a limited extent and, as discussed above, in dif-
ferent degrees. Real capital can only migrate slowly, but, in principle, it has no lasting location
preferences for one area or another; what matters is the return that can be generated. Investments
in the joining country, I, result in convex adjustment costs  ) (I ϕ  which reduce the speed of capital
adjustment. It is assumed that  () 0 ' ' , 0 for 0 ' , 0 for 0 ' , 0 ) 0 ( ' 0 > ϕ > > ϕ < < ϕ = ϕ = ϕ I I . By con-
trast, labour can migrate very quickly — a train journey of a few hours is often sufficient to reach
a work place in the core area. Nevertheless, people typically do not want to migrate. They prefer
to stay at home and migrate only if the reward in terms of a wage increase is sufficiently high. Let
X stand for the number of guest workers who have migrated to the core area. Since they prefer to
live at home in principle, they incur an aggregate cost  () , X ψ  when they live and work in the
core area, which measures both the subjective aversion against doing so and the objective costs
involved.  () X ψ  does not represent one-off migration cost. Instead, it refers to the recurring costs
associated with staying in the other country. Examples of the objective costs are the costs of
‘commuting’ or of regular trips home, and of having to pay larger rents than at home. An example
of the subjective cost is homesickness. Some guest workers have a low preference for their home
country and do not go back there very often; for others the situation is the reverse.  () X ψ  de-
scribes the total costs of all guest workers staying in the core country as a function of their num-
ber. Since the guest workers differ and are ranked in the order of their individual cost, it follows
that  ()0 ' > ψ X . Since the first guest worker faces no cost and successive guest workers are in-
creasingly averse to migration, it also follows that  () 0 0 = ψ and  0 ' ' > ψ .
                                                
4  Related models can be found in Sinn (2000) and Sinn and Sinn (1991, Chapter 5).13
Because free transfer of knowledge is assumed, the joining country produces its goods
with the same linearly homogeneous production function ƒ(K,L) as the core area, where real
capital K and labour L are the factors of production. The constant labour force potential of the
joining country is L*, and the number of guest workers is
(1) X = L* – L.
A worker can work for a fixed effective wage rate w* in the core area or for an effective wage
rate of size w at home.
5 Workers with a high home country preference,  () w w X − > ψ * ',  w o r k  a t
home, because the wage differential is not sufficient to compensate them for the cost of working
in the core area. The reverse holds for those workers who have some aversion against leaving
home, for whom  w w − < ψ * ' ; they decide to be guest workers. The marginal worker who is just
indifferent between migrating and staying at home is implicitly defined by the condition
(2) () w w X − = ψ * '.
The effective wage rate w which drives the migration decision is the worker’s subjective
money equivalent of a benefit bundle consisting of the pecuniary market wage  p w  and the benefit
resulting from firms’ expense per employee,  s w , necessary to meet the government-determined
social standard, 
                                                
5 The star is chosen here as the index for the labour force potential of the joining country and the wage rate of the
core country, because these two values show up in the model as steady state variables of employment and the
wage rate in the joining country.14
(3)  ( ) s p w w U w , ≡ , 
where 0 , , 0 , 22 11 2 1 < > U U U U . Similarly, w*, the given effective wage rate in the core area, is the
subjective money equivalent of the direct and indirect wage elements available there. The sum of
the two wage components is the cost of labour to the firm as reported in Figure 1; however, the
sum is not necessarily what the migrants are interested in. Nevertheless, it is assumed that U is
linearly homogeneous and normalised in a way that
(4) ( ) s p s p w w w w U + = , i f   p w and 
s w  are chosen such that  1 2 1 = =U U . 
To explain the empirical fact that social standards are chosen by governments rather than
the firms themselves, a basic information asymmetry between workers and firms, which gives rise
to a lemons problem, can be assumed. While each firm knows its expense for its own measures to
improve the quality of its work places, workers have a more limited knowledge when they make
their employment decisions. They know the country average, but not the efforts of their future
employers at the time they sign their employment contracts. Thus, each single firm has an incen-
tive to underinvest in the quality of its own work places. If it does so, it saves costs, but will not,
or not immediately, be punished by not being able to attract or keep workers. An equilibrium
emerges in the labour market where the quality of work places is inefficiently low unless the gov-
ernment imposes the right social standard as a binding constraint on firms’ choices. In this section
the time path of social standards is treated as a given in the decision problems of private agents.
The next section will consider the national government’s policy choice concerning this time path. 15
It is debatable whether the information asymmetry carries over to the choice between
countries. However, it is much easier to acquire the information about countries than about indi-
vidual firms. Thus the assumption that workers know the country-specific social standards when
they make their migration decisions seems reasonable. A Pole who migrates to Germany knows
under which conditions he has worked in Poland and has rather accurate expectations about the
social standards prevailing in Germany.
Let t indicate calendar time. Unless otherwise indicated all equations hold for all points in
time, t > 0, where zero is the time of joining the union. Variables like X, L, or w are time depend-
ent magnitudes. It is assumed that no migration is possible before the time of joining and that, in
the joining country, the marginal product with full employment is below the wage rate in the core
area because the initial stock of capital, K0 , is sufficiently low:
(5) () () [] 0 ' , 0 = ψ = t X t X ,
()
. 0 for 




L K f w L
A rational expectations equilibrium is modelled, because the national government or a su-
pranational government like the EU cannot be assumed to have better foresight than the partici-
pants in the market. The representative firm in the joining country takes the rate of interest and
the time path of the pecuniary wage as given, and in equilibrium this anticipated time path equals
the actual one. The firm also knows the time path of the government-imposed social standard, and
at each point in time it spends the amount of money per worker,  s w , necessary to meet the then-16
prevailing standard. The firm chooses the time paths of its labour use, L, and its net investment, I,























The current-value Hamiltonian of this problem is
() ( ) () qI I I L w w L K f H s p + ϕ − − + − = ,,
where q is the co-state variable of the stock of capital, i.e. Tobin’s q. 
Applying Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, the first order conditions 
(7) 0 = − − =
∂
∂











the canonical equation 
(9)  K f q r q − = − &
                                                
6  The formulation leaves open whether investment is financed by equity or loan capital. Because taxes are not dis-17
and the transversality condition 





e t K t q
can be derived. 
The Policy of the National Government 
Knowing the behaviour of migrants and private firms as described in the previous section, it is the
task of the national government to choose the time path of the social standard and hence the time
path of the necessary expense per worker,  s w , which maximises national welfare. In the present
context, national welfare, W, is the sum of the present value of the representative firm’s cash flow
according to (6) and the present value of the money equivalents of the direct and indirect wage
benefits earned at home,  ( ) L w w U s p ⋅ + , and abroad,  () L L w − ⋅ * * , minus the migration cost
() L L − ψ *.
7 
(11)  () () [] () () [] () () () [] {} t e t I t I t L t w t w t L t K f W
rt




∫ ϕ − − + − =
{( ) ( ) [] () () [] () [] }
rt
s p e t L L t L L w t L t w t w U
−
∞
− ψ − − ⋅ + + ∫ * * * ,
0
dt
                                                                                                                                                             
criminatory the two ways of financing it are equivalent.
7  It could be argued that the return to capital earned by foreign investors which has to be financed out of the output
produced in the joining area would have to be subtracted in the welfare calculation. However, if this is done, it is
also necessary to add the funds flowing in at the time of investment. As the present value of the total cash flow
between the joining country and its foreign investors is zero, this amendment of the equation would not affect the18
The constraints of the government’s optimisation include the migration rule (2) and the firms’
optimality conditions (7) – (9). 
Consider the effect on W of a marginal perturbation  ) (t ε  of the time path of  s w . This
perturbation incurs a first-order effect and a second-order effect on national welfare. The latter
results from the general equilibrium reactions of the time paths of I and L, given the time paths of
the direct and indirect wage components  p w and  s w . It is zero since the marginal perturbation
takes place around the private optima. None of the two integrals in (11) takes on a different
value.
8 
The first-order effect results from the changes in the direct and indirect wage components,
given the behaviour of private agents as described by L and I . The relationship between these two
wage components is given by (7), which obviously implies that  1 / − = ∂ ∂ s p w w . If the government
has optimised its policy, the perturbation is unable to change welfare. Thus it is a necessary con-
dition for an optimum that 
{} () () []
rt
s p s p I L e L t w t w U t w t w U t W
−
∞
⋅ − = ∆ ∫ ) ( ), ( ) ( ), ( ) ( 1 2
0
, ε dt =0 .
Since this condition must hold for arbitrary perturbations  ) (t ε , it is also necessary that 
(12) 0 ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 ≥ ∀ = t w w U w w U s p s p .
                                                                                                                                                             
results. In fact, discounting with the rate of return in the core area, r, already correctly expresses the joining coun-
try’s funding cost.19
Because of the linear homogeneity of the utility function this optimality implies that the govern-
ment-imposed work place standard will improve gradually in step with a rise in the market wage.
Because of the normalisation of the utility function assumed with (4), equation (12) implies that
the utility from having a job in the domestic economy, which above was called the effective
wage, can simply be taken to be the algebraic sum of the wage paid out to the workers and the
per-capita expense involved by satisfying the government-imposed work standard: 
(13)  s p w w w + = .
If the government did not satisfy equation (12), the effective wage would be lower than this sum,
because an excess burden from setting non-optimal social standards would have to be subtracted.
Proposition 1: Maximising social welfare, the government of the joining country chooses a time
path of the social standard such that the marginal utilities of the pecuniary wage and the firms’
expenses necessary to satisfy the standard are equal.
The Overall Welfare Optimum
After studying the optimality conditions of private agents and the national government, a supra-
national perspective will now be taken to check whether the accusation of social dumping is justi-
fied. Consider the optimisation problem of a benevolent social planner. If the result of this opti-
misation problem does not differ from the outcome of the previous two sections, there is no rea
                                                                                                                                                             
8  Note, e.g., that the derivative of the integrand of the second integral with regard to L is zero because of the mar-20
son to intervene by harmonising social standards or similar measures. If it does, supranational ac-
tions may be considered. 
From an international perspective, the welfare goal does not differ from the national one
as long as it can be assumed that the term  () [] [] ) ( * * * t L L t L L w − ψ − − ⋅  correctly measures the
social benefit from sending guest workers to the core country. Such an assumption is justified in
the competitive small-country case considered here because w* equals the fixed marginal product
of labour in the core country minus a potential excess burden from setting sub-optimal work stan-




0 , , ,
W
s p w w I L
∞  s. t.  = = 0 ) 0 ( K K const. and  I K = & ,
where W is defined as in (11). The current-value Hamiltonian for this problem is 
) ( . ) * ( ) * ( * ) , ( ) ( ) , ( I q L L L L w L w w U w w I I L K f H s p s p + − − − ⋅ + ⋅ − + − − − =ψ ϕ
Here, the term  ) ( ) , ( s p s p w w U w w − +  is the per capita excess burden from a non-optimal choice
of social standards and q is again the co-state variable of the stock of capital, K. The necessary
conditions for a maximum of the Hamiltonian are
(14) [] 0 ' * ) , ( ) ( = ψ + − − + − =
∂
∂
w w w U w w f
L
H
s p s p L
                                                                                                                                                             
ginal migration condition (2).21




















and the canonical equation is
(18) K f q r q − = − & .
The transversality condition of this problem is 





e t K t q  .
Equations (16) and (17) coincide with the national optimum as defined by (12) and (13) with re-
gard to the work standard policy. Thus the term in squared brackets in (14) disappears, and obvi-
ously the marginal conditions coincide with conditions (7) – (10) which characterise a market
equilibrium. This is the response to the accusation of social dumping.
Proposition 2: The transformation process chosen by market forces and the work standard pol-
icy chosen by the joining country’s government are efficient from a supranational perspective. 
If the national choices were not efficient, a supranational agency such as the EU would
have to think about potential remedies including the frequently demanded harmonisation of social22
standards. However, Proposition 2 confirms that this is not necessary. Since the decentralised
solution including the decentralised choice of government actions leads to a first-best optimum,
there is no social dumping and no need for centralised government actions. Systems competition
with work place standards works even though systems competition with public redistribution
does not. 
The social optimality of the national government’s choice is even warranted in a second-
best sense, when the core area itself sets a non-optimal standard, because a potential excess bur-
den form having a wrong policy in the core area was taken into account. Nevertheless, it will be
assumed in the following sections that the core area’s governments have also chosen optimal so-
cial standards according to the same utility function relevant in the joining countries. In this case,
there is no excess burden in the core area, and the effective wage there, w*, equals the marginal
product of labour in the core area. 
The Properties of the Catching-up Process
 While the above analysis has clarified a number of normative policy issues, it has not yet ex-
plored the positive implications of the model set up. Suppose the government of the joining
country chooses the optimal time path of social standards, firms optimise their employment and
investment decisions and households optimise their migration decisions. Which transition path
will be taken by a less-developed country joining a well-developed core region like the EU?
Applying (8) or (15), a central differential equation for the growth of private investment
over time follows from (9) or (18):23
(20) () [] ()
() I







It follows from equations (1), (2), (7) and (13) that
(21) () ( ) L L w L K f w L − ψ − = = * ' * ,
which implies a functional relation of the type
(22) () K L φ =











follows from an implicit differentiation of (21).
This indicates that if there is capital investment in the joining country, employment will
increase. As assumed with (5) the joining country is undercapitalised and has a low marginal pro-
ductivity of labour, and as indicated by (20), the stock of capital cannot adjust instantaneously
after joining, but only gradually with the passage of time. It thus follows from (21) that there will
be an immediate out-migration of guest workers and that the resulting initial wage rate will be
below the effective wage rate in the core area by the marginal cost of staying in the host country.
Since, because of the assumption of an immediate transfer of knowledge, the two countries have24
identical production functions, they also have the same factor price frontiers. The marginal pro-
ductivity of capital in the joining country after the migration of the guest workers is thus above
that in the core area, if it is assumed that the marginal productivity of capital in the core area is
equal to the rate of interest r because the adjustment of the capital stock has already been com-
pleted there.
If capital is being accumulated after this initial adjustment, this will change the factor
prices. From (21)-(23) it is possible to establish that the marginal product of labour increases,
() []
0 ' ' '
d
, d
> φ ⋅ ψ =
φ
K
K K fL , 









K K fK .
Let K* be the capital stock at which the marginal product of labour in the joining country would
be equal to the wage rate in the core area:  () [] * * *, w K K f L ≡ φ . The fact that the two regions
have the same factor price frontiers then implies that the joining country’s marginal productivity
of capital would equal the common interest rate r if K increases to K*:
 
() [] r K K fK = φ * *, .25
Figure 2: Factor Price Equalisation between the Joining Region and the Core Region
Figure 2 explains these relationships by showing the joining country’s movement along
the factor price frontier. Before people migrate, and before the equilibrium described above is
produced, with freedom of movement capital intensity in the joining area is very low. Point (0)
gives the values of the effective wage rate and the marginal productivity of capital associated with
this. The spontaneous migration of guest workers that occurs immediately after joining leads to
an instantaneous jump along the factor price frontier from (0) to (1). Provided that capital subse-
quently flows into the joining country, there will be subsequent gradual movement from point (1)
to point (2) on the factor price frontier, where point (2) is characterised by the critical level of
capital, K*, at which the factor prices in the core region and the joining area are equal. 26
The movement from (1) to (2) takes place if the stock of capital increases. Whether this
presumption is correct can be derived from the differential equation (20) which, by applying (22),
can also be written as 
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The implications of this differential equation, combined with the definitional differential equation
& KI = , are shown in Figure 3. The figure includes all time paths which are compatible with (24).
The  & I = 0 curve shows those combinations of I and K for which the numerator of (24) is zero.
The curve divides the figure into two areas, where movements are in different directions as shown
by the arrows. Some paths cut the  0 = I & curve horizontally, others meet the abscissa vertically.
Just one path, the stable branch, leads to the point with the co-ordinates (I = 0, K = K*). Only this
path can characterise the market equilibrium.
Paths above the stable branch indicate positive and increasing investment up to the point
where K = K* . Since the marginal productivity of capital will then be equal to the market rate of
interest, further investment would be unable to bear any adjustment cost. However, the positive
level of investment characterising paths above the stable branch implies such cost. This contra-
diction rules out the possibility that such paths could characterise a market equilibrium.
Paths below the stable branch will eventually cut the abscissa from above before the mar-
ginal product of capital is equal to the market rate of interest. After this the capital stock will
shrink at an increasing speed and become zero in finite time so that the policy described by (24)
becomes infeasible. 27
On the stable branch, the level of investment shrinks to zero as K approaches K*. Thus K*
will not be reached in finite time, but the economy converges to this capital stock as time goes to
infinity. It follows from (15) and (18) that the co-state variable, Tobin’s q, is greater than one on
the stable branch and converges to one as time goes to infinity. Thus it is clear that the transver-
sality conditions (10) and (19) are met. All the necessary conditions for a welfare optimum and an
optimum in the market agents’ planning problem are satisfied. 28
Figure 3: Investment and Capital in the Adjustment Process
The optimal adjustment strategy after integration into the common capital and labour
markets is shown in Figure 3 by a rapid increase in investment from (0) to (1) and a gradual de-
velopment from (1) to (2). In this gradual development process investment is at first very high
and then becomes successively smaller. The capital stock, and with it the whole economy, thus
initially grows at a very high rate and then at a gradually falling rate towards the value K*, which
characterises complete factor price equalisation.29
Figure 4: The Adjustments in the Labour Market
Finally, to round off the overview, it is useful to take a look at Figure 4.
9 The development
path of the joining country is shown there in a labour market diagram with supply and demand
curves. At the time of joining, and before people and capital migrate, point (0) on the demand
curve  () L K f L , 0  is realised. The effective wage rate w0 is low enough to ensure full employment
of the labour force potential L*. This point is not an equilibrium when the borders are open, be-
cause the wage difference with the core area exceeds the marginal migration cost which is zero
when no one migrates. In accordance with the assumptions made, people are quick but unwilling
and capital is slow but willing. Therefore there is initially an instantaneous jump along the old
                                                
9  The figure must be interpreted only qualitatively. For clarity of presentation the number of guest workers (L* - L)
is very much exaggerated in the figure. If the “joining country” can be taken to be the set of ten east European
countries applying for EU membership, an emigration in the order of 5% – 7% or 5 – 7 million people can be ex-
pected. See Sinn, Flaig, Munz and Werding (2000). 30
demand for labour curve up to point (1) where this curve is cut by the supply curve. The supply
curve shows the number of workers in the reverse order of their reservation wage. The reservation
wage is the effective wage rate in the core area, w*, minus the individual cost of staying in the
home country,  ' ψ . The realisation of point (1) means that initially L* – L1 people migrate to the
core area as guest workers and that the same number of (less productive) jobs in the joining
country are lost.
After point (1) is reached capital accumulation makes itself felt in the form of a gradual
rightward shift of the demand for labour curve towards position  ) *, ( L K fL . The market equilib-
rium point moves out from (1) gradually, but with diminishing speed, along the labour supply
curve towards point (2). In the course of this gradual adjustment process, the number of guest
workers falls until they all have returned home again, and the effective wage rate rises until it
reaches the effective wage rate in the core area, w*. Thus, there is only a temporary population
shift from the joining country to the core area, and not a permanent one. At first, there is a rapid
wave of out-migration but, over time, when wages rise as the capital stock increases, complete
return migration to the home country takes place. This two-sided migration pattern is typical for
guest worker migration flows from countries in transition. 
Recall that this process incorporates not only private market decisions, but also the deci-
sions of the national government in that this government gradually redefines the social standard
for employment contracts. According to assumptions (3) and (4), in the national optimum as
given by (12), both components of the effective wage rate w*, the pecuniary wage  p w  and the
non-pecuniary wage resulting from the firms’ social expenses  s w , rise in step during the adjust-
ment from point (1) to point (2). As it was assumed in addition that the governments in the core
area have optimised their social policies, reaching point (2) also implies that both wage compo31
nents converge towards the respective values in the core area. Eventually, the joining country’s
government will impose the same social standards as the governments of the core area does. 
The following proposition summarises the positive implications of the model.
Proposition 3: Opening the borders between a less-developed joining area and a well-developed
core area results in a two-sided migration process. In the short term with an initially given capi-
tal stock, some of the working population of the joining country migrate as guest workers to the
core area. In the joining country, this reduces the labour supply, increases wages, destroys some
of the jobs and induces the national government to raise the social standard in step with the
wages. Because interest rates are the same in both regions and because the subjective and objec-
tive costs of migration mean that wage equalisation cannot happen in the short run, the joining
country attracts an inflow of capital from the core area. The inflow of capital increases the de-
mand for labour in the joining country and leads to a further increase in the wage rate and the
social standard which results in a gradual return migration of the guest workers. The capital in-
flow dries up when the market wage and the social standard have reached the respective levels in
the core area and all the guest workers have gone back home again.
As the catching-up process described characterises the market equilibrium, an equilibrium
in systems competition and an overall welfare optimum, the result once again refutes the hypothe-
sis of social dumping insofar as it refers to the artificial reduction in wages and fringe benefits –
and not to the redistributive measures. A government that acts in the national interest knows that
measures to promote the use of capital would be as harmful as harmonising the factor prices too32
soon, because both of these measures would involve departing from the joining country’s optimal
adjustment path. Wages and work-related fringe benefits must be lower than in the core area
during a long transition period before an adequate capital stock has been accumulated, and in the
long run, they adjust by themselves without the need for central government intervention meas-
ures. The temporary lag in wages and social standards has nothing at all to do with social dump-
ing; it is the result of the efficient working of the Invisible Hand in systems competition. 
Lessons from German Unification
The adjustment problem just described is extremely important for the development of the Euro-
pean Union, for the eastern enlargement involves the entry of countries whose economies are very
backward compared to those of the core countries. Because wage costs there are between 10%
and 15% of the German (west) level, in the core countries the political pressure for a harmonisa-
tion of wages and social standards in the run up to entry is increasing. 
The practical example of German unification shows how dangerous such a policy would
be. Following unification, Germany learned the painful way that the laws of the market cannot be
ignored. In anticipation of a wonderful future, the policy of early equalisation of wages and social
standards was given the go-ahead and the economies of the new Länder were led up a blind alley.
Social standards were adjusted immediately after unification, and the hourly wage costs in east
German manufacturing jumped to more than 70% of the western level in only five years, although
they were only 7% of this level before unification at the then prevailing exchange rate. The con-
sequence of this explosion of the labour cost was a loss of competitiveness which destroyed
nearly 80% of the jobs in manufacturing. Mass unemployment and a westward net migration of
around 10% of the east German population resulted.33
In terms of Figure 4, the east German wage policy means that the automatic increase in
wages from  0 w  to  1 w , which would have occurred by itself as a result of westward migration and
cutbacks in the east German labour market, was not waited for. Instead, there was a movement
along the labour demand curve  () L K fL , 0  upwards to the left towards point (2’). The excess sup-
ply of labour shown in the figure is the present mass unemployment. Unemployment, at least as
far as it was triggered off by too rapid an increase in wages and the immediate implementation of
west German labour standards, is an obvious sign of misallocation, a waste of valuable working
time, and a irrecoverable loss of national output.
Germany has had to pay for the misallocation with massive social transfers to the new
Länder. In the first decade after unification, loans of  € 750 net for the eastern transfers had accu-
mulated and the government debt more than doubled. The European Union cannot permit itself to
make such an expensive policy mistake.
Fortunately, the German policy mistake is not likely to be repeated at the European level,
because first, people can learn and second, the special policy mechanisms that were responsible
for wage policies in Germany do not extend to the European level. The German problem was that
the western trade unions and the western employers negotiated the east German wages among
themselves – there were no east German firms in existence at the time (spring 1991) the critical
wage decisions were made. There were proxy negotiations in which both of the ‘negotiating par-
ties’ had the same interest in high east German wages because they wanted to avoid unpalatable
competition in their own west German branches of industry. Similarly, western employers and
union representatives helped convince the government to impose west German work standards
and the west German social security system on the east Germans right from the beginning. Cir-
cumstances like these can, in principle, be ruled out for the EU accession countries because ne34
gotiations there will take place between national trade unions and national employers. This will
ensure that the negotiating parties represent opposing interests with regard to wage policies. Also,
it is hard to imagine that the governments of the accession countries will come under pressure
from the employers’ and employees’ representatives of the core countries. Thus it is very likely
that these countries will approximate the optimum described above more than east Germany was
able to do.
Why Low Wages and Social Standards Do not Indicate Social Dumping
The accusation of social dumping, which the less-developed European countries seem to have
engaged in because their wages and social standards are low, is not justified. Low wages, low so-
cial standards and high returns to capital are the necessary concomitants of a long-term adjust-
ment process. Even in a common European economy without artificial barriers to factor move-
ments there are natural barriers large enough to slow down the process of factor price equalisation
for a long time, and the governments of the joining countries will take this into account when they
define the speed with which they adjust social standards to those in the developed core areas. In
allocative terms, it is a mistake to want to overcome these barriers with counteracting policy
measures. It would be particularly mistaken to attempt to enforce the equalisation of factor prices
and social standards appropriate for the long run by means of premature harmonisation. Such an
attempt would only reproduce the east German debacle in the new countries joining the European
Union.
Left to themselves, decentralised choices of households, firms and national governments
will solve the adjustment problem of a relatively underdeveloped joining country in that some of
the labour force potential will move to the core area as guest workers. This will then lead to35
spontaneous increases in wages and a parallel adjustment in social standards which will reduce
the pressure to migrate. As the effective wage level will still be well below that of the core area
despite the spontaneous increase, there will be an import of capital and this will successively raise
labour productivity, wages and social standards. To the extent that the increase in effective wages
results in a closure of the wage gap, it reduces the incentive for investment and thus prevents a
further increase in effective wages. Wages and social standards will equalise in the long run. The
mistrust of the allocative efficiency of systems competition is not justified. The lag in wages and
non-wage benefits in the still-undeveloped countries is the key characteristic of an efficient trans-
formation process.
A simple but important insight for the assessment of systems competition follows from
this. Because private competition and systems competition carry out the gradual transformation of
the joining country perfectly, there is no need for a supranational government like the EU to in-
tervene by harmonising social standards. Both the EU Social Charter and the ILO conventions are
interventions of dubious use.36
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